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Book Reviews
Exploring strategy
Strategy: A History
By Lawrence Freedman
Reviewed by James MacDougall, Ph.D, Chairman, Department of National
Security and Strategy, US Army War College, former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Eurasia.

E

ncyclopedic in scope and inductive in method, Sir Lawrence
Freedman’s grand volume: Strategy: A History, presents the fruits
of a life-long exploration into the meaning and utility of the
concept of strategy. In many respects an intellectual voyage of discovery, Freedman begins by describing the evolution of strategy through
its pre-Napoleonic history and then, in turns, explores its development
and use in three distinct provinces: military, revolutionary-political, and
business-corporate. In the grand tradition of his British predecessors
who wrote during the age of exploration, Freedman casts a perceptive
and discerning eye on the territory he surveys. The result is a trove of
keen observations and insights owing much for its success to Freedman’s
lucid and engaging prose.
While acknowledging the word “strategy” did not come into common
usage until the early part of the nineteenth century, Freedman takes the
view that strategy in the sense of “practical problem-solving” is as old as
history (72). He thus begins his excursion (Part I) with observations on
the interrelationships bordering communities of chimpanzees; proceeds
to review examples of strategy in the Hebrew Bible and the world of
Classical Greece; reviews the canonical texts of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli
and completes his examination of the origins of strategy with a review
of Milton’s Paradise Lost. A clear dichotomy emphasized throughout this
opening section and one reappraised to good effect in other sections of
the book is the difference between strategies based on force and strategies based on guile; in other words – strategies of strength or strategies
of cunning.1 Subsequently, however, particularly after considering the
advent of the levee on masse, Freedman concludes “[o]nce warfare moved
to mass armies with complex organizations, there would be limits to
what could be achieved by means of guile. The emphasis would be on
force” (65).
And so in Part II, “Strategies of Force,” the modern history of
military strategy is charted beyond way-points recognized by students:
decisive battle; wars of annihilation or attrition; maneuver; the indirect
approach; deterrence; guerilla warfare; counterinsurgency and a myriad
of others. Here, as well, broader concepts such as geopolitics; continental,
maritime, naval and air power; and game theory with its special relationship to nuclear strategy, are also analyzed. Although the main contours
are familiar terrain, the history and theory covered in this section are
viewed frequently from a unique vantage point revealing fresh insights.
An example is the observation that, while Clausewitz recognized the
1      This dichotomy also is highlighted in Charles Hill, Grand Strategy: Literature, Statecraft, and World
Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010)
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subordination of war to policy, the prevailing assumption at that time
was “a political victory would naturally follow a military victory” and
further “[i]f the assumption was wrong, then strategy’s focus on military
affairs was insufficient” (94). The point is prescient with a continuing
relevance to modern day strategic challenges.
In Part III, “Strategies from Below,” Freedman chronicles in detail
the political strategies of radicals and revolutionaries including Marx,
Gandhi, Che Guevara and others. In the American domestic political
context he surveys the political strategies of Martin Luther King, the
Civil Rights movement, as well as other individuals and causes over the
last several decades. While decidedly underdogs in the political process,
each individual or group struggled to mobilize political forces in efforts
to cause radical change or overthrow existing political elites and make
a claim on political power. For most national security professionals,
this section represents less familiar terrain made more challenging by
the surfeit of biographical detail that at times clouds more salient perspectives on strategy. Nevertheless, some essential points relevant to
strategy in any context may be gleaned. Among them is the significance
of marshaling popular opinion in support of an ideological or political
strategy, by means of, as Freedman notes (quoting Harold Lasswell) “the
management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant
symbols” (339). This point has modern echoes in discussions over
“strategic narratives.” Freedman ends this section with some poignant
observations about electoral politics in the United States and the party
strategies related to the “permanent campaign.”
In the final section of field observations Part IV “Strategy from
Above” Freedman surveys the extensive literature on business strategy
noting the volume of this literature now exceeds that on military strategy.
The search for strategy in business, based on the developing “science
of management” throughout the 1950s and 1960s, led to the relentless
pursuit of optimal solutions based on mathematical precision and calculation. Strategic planning became paramount in large corporations.
Later, when results based on strict rationality proved less satisfactory
than expected, a backlash against rigid planning models ensued. In a
vignette reflecting this changed view, Freedman cites former General
Electric CEO Jack Welch, who cited approvingly a letter to the editor in
Fortune magazine condemning strategic planning as an “endless quest by
managers for a paint-by-numbers approach, which would automatically
give them answers” (504). Subsequent popular approaches to applying
the strategic lessons of history’s great military commanders to the business environment (The Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun, for example)
also seemed to deliver less than advertised as the basis for sound business strategies.
It is in the final chapter of this section where we begin to see, having
explored the nature of strategy in three distinct areas, the process of
induction moving us from observation to generalization. Referring to
an article by Henry Mintzberg and James Waters, Freedman identifies
a major dichotomy in the field of business strategy as that “between
deliberate or emergent strategies” (554).2 Is strategy a rationally calcu2      Henry Mintzberg and James A. Waters, “Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent,” Strategic
Management Journal 6, no. 3 (July-September 1985): 257-272.
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lated plan, developed at higher echelons and provided to subunits for
implementation, or, rather, a product of fluid decision-making described
by Mintzberg and Waters as “a pattern in a stream of decisions[?]”
Freedman’s answer to this question is one of the central themes of the
book and is therefore worth tracking in some detail.
As early as the book’s opening epigram, the offhandish quote
from the heavyweight prize-fighter Michael Tyson: “Everyone has a
plan ‘till they get punched in the mouth” (ix), the reader is aware of
the author’s skepticism for likening strategy to a calculated plan. This
theme winds throughout the main sections of the book - throughout the fields of military, political and business strategy. From von
Moltke’s famous dictum, “no plan survives contact with the enemy”
(104) to Jack Welsh’s dismissal (noted above) of efforts to fashion a
“paint-by-number” approach to strategy, Sir Lawrence Freedman casts
doubt on the idea of strategy as the prescriptive result of a rational
calculation and direction. Indeed, titles of several of the book’s chapters: “The False Science”; “The Myth of the Master Strategist”; and
“Formulas, Myths and Propaganda”, indicate a central objective of
Freedman’s book: to de-mythologize the idea of strategy as a master
plan. By the end of the book, having observed this to be the case in
those domains visited, Freedman concludes: “The various strands of
literature examined in this book all began confidently with a belief that
given the right measures demanding objectives could be achieved on a
regular basis. […] In all three cases, experience undermined the foundations of this confidence” (608).
Sir Lawrence Freedman identifies two basic obstacles to strategy as a
rational progression of deliberate steps: the essentially conflictual nature
of the strategic environment, and the role of chance and unpredictability.
On the first point, given that strategy typically involves interaction with
willful opponents or competitors, predicting how they will act/react
introduces a significant element of uncertainty into strategic calculation. Further, as the second point suggests, chance and unpredictability
bedevil any future-oriented efforts to plan and act. Taken together,
these points call into question the very nature of strategic planning and
strategy making.
Is strategy then an illusion, “not worth an empty eggshell,” as suggested by the ant-strategist Leo Tolstoy (98)? Counseling skepticism, but
not fatalism, Freedman’s answer seems to be “not necessarily.” Although
difficult, and demonstrably not the result of a perfectly rational process,
strategy, Freedman concludes, is still important and necessary. He
counsels: “…we have little choice but to identify a way forward dependent on human agency which might lead to a good outcome. It is as
well to avoid illusions of control, but in the end all we can do is act as
if we can influence events. To do otherwise is to succumb to fatalism”
(622). In this respect, Freedman’s answer to the question of whether
strategy is a deliberate or emergent process reflects Mintzberg’s view:
“strategy formation walks on two feet, one deliberate, the other emergent” (555). Seen in this light, the simple shorthand of strategists: the
ends-ways-means construct, appears too linear and must be grounded
in a broader understanding of chance, contingency, and uncertainty.
We are reminded of Murray and Grimsley’s observation on Clausewitz’s
remarkable trinity (emotion, chance, and reason). “Although Clausewitz
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intended this trinity to describe the nature of armed conflict, it applies
with equal relevance to the conduct of strategy in peace as well as war.”3
The creative strategist is thus free to roam throughout the realms of
chance and probability, all the while focused on strategy as an instrument of policy.
Like any good volume on exploration, Freedman’s Strateg y is full
of suggestions for profitable follow-on voyages. One such potentially
productive route for exploration is Freedman’s association of strategy
and power. In the book’s preface he provides a brief definition of
strategy as a political art: “the art of creating power” (xii). In political
science, “power” is a fundamentally contested concept with understandings ranging from “power over resources” to “power over outcomes.”
Freedman recognizes this essential distinction in a discussion of revolutionary politics (372-373) but a more detailed discussion of power,
and strategy as the art of creating power, could have been beneficial.
Indeed, in previous work, Freedman focused on the relationship of
power and strategy to good effect.4 Tellingly, in this work, in addition
to examining the concept of power, Freedman defined strategy as “the
art of creating power to obtain the maximum political objectives using
available military means.”5 Given the scope of the book under review,
a working definition of strategy as “the art of creating power to obtain
the maximum _____ objectives,” where the blank might be filled in
alternately with the words military, political, or economic, would seem
fitting. Adding the concept of objectives to the definition precludes
criticism that strategy as simply “creating power” would amount to no
more than a purposeless accumulation of resources. Recognizing at an
early point the conception of strategy in this book is “governed by the
starting point, and not the end point” (xi), it nevertheless seems that
strategy requires both. In fact, Freedman concludes as much later in
the book when discussing strategy as a process of managing emerging
variables: “[t]his does not mean that it is easy to manage without a view
of a desired end state. Without some sense of where the journey should
be leading it will be difficult to evaluate alternative outcomes” (611). The
central idea of strategy that emerges from the book is one that is part
plan, part process - a combination of rational calculation and adaptation
to evolving conditions. This notion is summarized agreeably in the
letter to Fortune magazine quoted by Jack Welch and noted by Freedman:
“Strategy was not a lengthy action plan. It was the evolution of a central
idea through continually changing circumstances” (504).
Strateg y: A History, is a grand exploration and at times takes the
reader through uncharted terrain. The book’s concluding chapters (Part
V, “Theories of Strategy”) offer not so much theories of strategy making
derived through inductive observation, but rather thoughts on how recent
scholarship in cognitive psychology and philosophy might help frame
scripts or strategic narratives useful in advancing the process of making
strategy. Here, as throughout, the observations are keen and suggest
many areas for potentially productive follow-up. Early in the book,
3      Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein, eds, The Making of Strategy: Rulers,
States and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5.
4      Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Studies and the Problem of Power,” in War, Strategy and
International Politics: Essays in Honor of Sir Michael Howard, eds. Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes and
Robert O’Neill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 279-294.
5      Ibid., 283.
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observing that “apes were astute when it came to working out power
balances” (8), Freedman suggests forming coalitions is a time-honored
and effective strategic approach. Given his focus on the relationship
between strategy and power, additional work on the concept of balance
of power, and its importance in strategy particularly, would be useful.
For the arm-chair traveler (or arm-chair strategist, as the case may
be) Sir Lawrence Freedman’s voyage of discovery through the world of
strategy is enriching and thought-provoking. One hopes he remains
intrepid and continues to help fill the “blank spots” on our mental
maps. One such important spot that receives increased attention is the
province of “grand strategy.” Should Freedman embark to explore this
domain one would be tempted to sign on as a deckhand.

The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy
in Historical Perspective
By Hew Strachan
Reviewed by Dr. Richard Swain, COL US Army Retired, Lawton, OK

T

his book, a collection of papers composed over a ten-year period, is
subject to multiple legitimate readings. Some British reviewers have
seen it simply as a critique of contemporary British and American military policy. However, the theme announced by the author, the Chichele
Professor of the History of War at Oxford, is an exploration of “strategy, what we understand by it, and how that understanding has changed”
(4). That seems to be the proper basis for evaluation.
Strachan indicts Huntington’s Soldier and the State with corrupting
professional-political dialog in both the United States, where he acknowledges it may reflect Constitutional norms, and in the United Kingdom,
where he argues it does not (76-77). Indeed, much of the book is engaged
with criticism of institutional arrangements for strategy formulation in
the United Kingdom and United States. Not surprisingly, the author is
better informed about the complexities of the former than the latter;
he probably overstates the influence of the Weinberger and Powell
doctrines, while understating the role of the National Security Council
system and the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. He undergirds his
arguments with what he sees as a corrective to an overly Anglophone
reading of Clausewitz (5) and Thucydides (257).
The most prominent idea in the Direction of War is the argument
that the understandings of policy and strategy have become so confused
the distinction between them has been lost, largely to the detriment
of strategic practice. In part, this confusion has been the result of the
intensification of wars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
critically in the First World War, when the higher direction of war in
the form of grand strategy came to comprehend the mobilization of all
national (and allied) means in pursuit of military victory. This result was
compounded after the Second World War by the speculative theoretical
flights of deterrence theorists, mostly American academics.

New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2013
335 pages
$29.99
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The greatest insight in Strachan’s argument lies precisely in his separation of policy and strategy as distinct and diverging influences with
often conflicting logics, both of which must be accommodated by the
policy maker and strategist. He does this first by pointing to the need to
set strategy in the context of the adversarial nature of war; doing so corrects for what he indicts as overemphasis on the instrumental function
of war derived from Clausewitz’s statement that “war is nothing but the
continuation of policy with other means” which first appears in a Note
of 10 July 1827 and later in Book I, “On the Nature of War.” This is not,
he reminds us, “a statement about the nature of war.” It is a statement
about the use of war, something made clearer, he feels, in Book VIII,
“War Plans.” He then expands on this point with the Policy-Politics
distinction, more or less glossed by Clausewitz’s use of the German term
Politik for both. “Politics,” he reminds us, “are inherently adversarial…
Policy has a more unilateral thrust…a policy…remains a statement of
one government’s intent…War,” he concludes, “is therefore no longer the
unilateral application of policy but the product of reciprocal exchanges
between diverging policies” (13).
In short, Strachan restores competitive reciprocity to the practice
of national strategy, which, in turn, accounts for the unpredictability
of strategic outcomes that reflect not the logical extension of one’s own
efforts but the sum of conflicting efforts of all actors to achieve diverging
goals. Later, looking back at Winston Churchill and Alan Brooke in
World War II, he observes that the policy maker and strategist must be
concerned with “what to do each day in the light of that day’s events,
of the situation on the ground and of real-time intelligence” (242-243).
Evolving strategic possibilities can require changes in policy even as they
conform with it. The effect of this on policy makers should be increased
modesty about the predictability of strategic effects; and on strategists,
increased attention to the need for continuous reassessment and adjustment, notably something Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike
Mullen addressed in his March 3, 2010 Landon Lecture at Kansas State
University6 (229).
A collection of related essays does not a treatise make and it is probably a mistake to read this one as though it does. Written over time,
for diverse purposes, the essays may address common themes, but
even reworking does not remove discontinuities in thought that result
from new insights or limitations imposed by the essay form. Strachan is
surely right to point out that the instrumental use of war suggested in
Clausewitz’s note of 1827, and Book I of On War, has sometimes been
misunderstood as a statement of some organic condition rather than
a requirement for war’s rational use. In a more comprehensive treatment, the author might be free to begin with deeper reflection on the
implicit distinction between strategy as a noun, defined more or less
as a program or pattern of actions intended to achieve some purpose,
associated as it must be with a predictive theory of success; and strategy
(-making) as an activity or verb, sensitive to the fluid and unpredictable
outcome of the clash of opposing wills and actions by multiple actors.
6      Admiral Mike Mullen, “Landon Lecture Series Remarks; As Delivered by Adm. Mike Mullen,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, Wednesday,
March 3, 2010.” Available at: http:///www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1336. Henry Mintzberg addressed this phenomenon in his book The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles
for Planning, Plans, Planners (New York: Free Press, 1994), 23-29.
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This is the distinction, after all, which creates the contrast the author
highlights between On War’s Book I and the discussion of war-making
in Book VIII, both of which include the “instrumental” insight of the
1827 note.
American readers should take seriously Strachan’s critique of
Huntington’s half-century old thesis on civil military relations, in light
of the quarter-century experience with the results of the GoldwaterNichols Act within the NSC System. Finally, a great deal of thought
must be given about whether the notion of strategy can still be limited
to the use of military forces, on which Strachan insists, or whether, as a
practical matter, the concept has been more expansive for over a century
and is likely to remain so because of the requirements of contemporary
and future conflicts. It is notable the Lawrence Freedman’s recent book
Strateg y, A History (Oxford, 2013) considers the applicability of the idea
in business writing, perhaps clarifying the concept by generalizing its
use.
This collection is in many ways a journal of the author’s own journey
of learning over a ten-year period in which he moved from the writing
of traditional military history to the role of policy advisor. It is a valuable
book that succeeds in reframing the idea of strategy and offers numerous insights into its practice in the direction of war.
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Political-Military Leadership
Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War
By Robert M. Gates
Reviewed by Dr. Steven Metz, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

D
New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
2014
618 pages
$35.00

uty is Robert Gates’ second volume of memoirs and covers his time
as Secretary of Defense in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama
administrations. Few people are better versed in how Washington works
(or doesn’t work) than Gates. He spent twenty-seven years in the Central
Intelligence Agency and National Security Council before becoming the
only Secretary of Defense asked to stay in office when the White House
changed hands between political parties. Because of this, the book’s
released caused a major stir, particularly in Washington.
Gates’ anger and unvarnished opinions about senior policymakers
and elected officials, including some still holding office drew the most
initial attention. While he respects the two presidents he served, Gates
indicts Washington’s hyperpartisan climate in general and Congress in
particular which he describes as “Uncivil, incompetent in fulfilling basic
constitutional responsibilities (such as time appropriates), micromanagerial, parochial, thin-skinned, [and] often putting self (and reelection)
before country.” He is particularly disdainful of Senator Harry Reid,
Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, and Vice President Joe Biden, at times
resorting to unnecessary low blows as when he sarcastically writes that
Biden “presumed to understand how to make CT (counterterrorism)
work better than Stan (McChrystal)” even though Biden was talking
about policy and strategy and General McChrystal’s expertise was at the
operational level of war.
Like any memoir, Duty does not weigh all sides of the story equally
but concentrates on explaining Gates’ position on key issues, particularly the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. One theme that will appeal to
military readers was Gates’ fierce dedication to the men and women in
uniform, particularly those in combat zones. Time after time he excoriates the Department of Defense for its preoccupation “with planning,
equipping, and training for future major wars with other nation-states,
while assigning lesser priority to current conflicts and other forms of
conflict, such as irregular or asymmetric war.” At times this compelled
him to take things into his own hands. He proudly recounts his efforts
at forcing improvements in the care of wounded warriors and jamming
through production of Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP)
armored fighting vehicles and increased intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
The crush of managing two wars and the daily operations of one
of the world’s largest and most complex organizations left Gates little
time for broad questions about American strategy. But there is also no
indication in Duty that he would have done so even if given the opportunity. For all of his talents, Secretary Gates was not a strategic visionary.
For instance, there is no indication that he seriously questioned the
assumptions that justified US involvement in Afghanistan even during
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the Obama administration’s major review of US strategy. Gates, like
the rest of the administration, accepted the idea that without a major
American effort, the Taliban would regain control over large parts or
all of Afghanistan and again provide a base for al Qaeda; and that al
Qaeda wanted to restore its base in Afghanistan, and having this would
increase the chances it would pull off another September 11-level attack
on the United States or US targets abroad. The failure to scrutinize the
basic assumptions of American strategy (or to mention such scrutiny if
it did take place) is a puzzling omission since by the time of the Obama
strategic review, much of the American public and Congress had begun
to doubt whether the security gained by US military involvement justified the monetary and blood costs. There are times when policymakers
must grapple with big strategic issues rather than the most immediate
ones. This did not happen while Gates was Defense Secretary.
While Gates did succeed in holding off congressional pressure
and buying additional time for his military commanders, the fact that
neither Iraq nor Afghanistan are likely to be seen as strategic victories
for the United States should send a stark message to the US military. The
United States treated its conflict with a transnational, nonstate enemy as
a war less because doing so was most effective than because the military was the most powerful tool available. This problem has not gone
away. Today the United States remains organized to use its high-tech
and high-quality forces to fight relatively short, politically unambiguous campaigns against other conventional militaries. It is not organized
to fight transnational nonstate enemies, whether ideological ones like
al Qaeda or criminal syndicates, even though every indication is that
this sort of conflict will persist. Gates understood this but there was
little he could do other than implore the rest of the US government,
particularly the State Department, to provide additional resources for
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Through herculean and even heroic efforts, Gates helped prevent
Iraq and Afghanistan from becoming utter fiascos. He was not, however,
able to turn them into strategic successes or do more than nudge the
Department of Defense in a new direction. But then no one else could
have, and probably no one could have done more to stave off disaster
than Gates did. The Department of Defense and American national
security strategy were not demonstrably better after his leadership, but
they also were no worse. Ultimately, Duty holds grim but important
lessons for the Army’s current and future strategic leaders: they will
face a hyperpartisan political climate and missions that devolve to the
military less because it is designed for them than because it is the least
bad option. As they read Gates’ memoirs—and all should—most will
share his anger and frustration but, like Gates himself, most will also be
determined to make the best of it they can.
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PROCONSULS: Delegated Political-Military Leadership from
Rome to America Today
By Carnes Lord
Reviewed by Don M. Snider, PhD, Distinguished Visiting Professor at the US
Army War College and Professor Emeritus, US Military Academy

Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012
254 pages
$30.99

F

irst, understand that this is a book about a unique form of leadership
at the strategic level, in the words of the author a “generic political
phenomenon seemingly never to have been systematically studied and
which remains a neglected – indeed, virtually an unrecognized – topic of
scholarly investigation and analysis.”
Thus, as the title states, the author’s attempt is to provide such a
systematic inquiry into the role of our “proconsuls.” Skirting scholarly
debates about an American empire while using their language, he further
defines: “the core of the proconsular function is political-military leadership…that in the best of cases rises to statesmanship; its chief challenge
is the coordination of civil and military authority in the periphery and
the alignment with political-military leadership at the center.” Few
authors could attempt such a broad inquiry into uncharted scholarship,
but Professor Lord is imminently qualified to do so, and as we shall
see, does so with remarkably fine results. With two earned doctorates
(Yale-classics; Cornell-political science), over a decade in the nationalsecurity policy arena in Washington in the 1980s and 1990s (National
Security Council; Assistant to the Vice President for National Security
Affairs; Distinguished Fellow at the National Defense University), and
three previous books in the field, he was uniquely qualified for such an
inquiry.
While the background is drawn from Rome, the focus of the book
is clearly on America as a modern democracy and great power –“an
effort has been made to include at least some discussion of all of the
most important figures who can plausibly be identified as proconsuls in
the properly functional sense of the term, from Spanish-American War
to the present [2012].” The most prominent among them are General
Leonard Wood and William Howard Taft in Cuba and the Philippines
in the early twentieth century; MacArthur in the Philippines, Japan,
and Korea from 1936-1951; General Lucius Clay in Germany in the late
1940’s; the intelligence operative Edward Lansdale in the Philippines
and Vietnam in the early 1950s; Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and
General Maxwell Taylor in Vietnam in the early 1960s; General Creighton
Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and William Colby in Vietnam
in the late 1960 and early 1970s; General Wesley Clark in the Balkans
in the late 1990s; Ambassador L. Paul Bremer in Iraq in 2003-04; and
General David Petraeus in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2006 [to 2011].
Each era, along with its American proconsuls, is presented in the
richly documented detail expected from an eminent scholar and practitioner of our national security affairs. But to this reader it is not the
individual analyses that are most informative for our work today and
into the future. Rather, it is the synthesis that Professor Lord brings in
the final chapter(s) when he gets to the “so what?” question: “Is proconsular leadership a good thing?” His main conclusion is unremarkable in
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its barest statement—“…that delegated political-military leadership had
been a significant independent variable in American national security
decision-making from the end of the nineteenth century to the present;
or more simply stated, that it has made a strategic difference.” But when
he develops this thesis in two broad directions by drawing from the
chapters of research, we see the major contribution of his endeavor in
the book.
First, with respect to individual proconsuls the author presents what
he considers to be a “respectable balance sheet”—“It reflects, above all,
the high caliber of these men and others like them who have served
the American Republic in high office since the nation’s emergence as a
great power. They were more than mere imperial functionaries. Though
not lacking in personal ambition, they were both American patriots and
change agents who seized opportunities available to them to shape or
steer national policy in the best interests of the United States and what
it stands for. In this regard they exercised leadership in the proper sense
of that term.”
After enjoying the more recent and familiar eras on that balance
sheet—Clark in Kosovo; Bremer in Iraq; Petraeus in the Middle East—
and setting them alongside the less familiar—MacArthur in the Far
East; Clay in Germany, and Lodge, et al. in Vietnam—it strikes me that
the author is a bit too generous in his overall assessment. In contrast,
his individual assessments are correctly negative in several cases, welldocumented and convincingly analyzed.
But it is the second broad direction in which he generalizes that I
believe most readers will find very fruitful insights for the current period
of defense reductions and beyond. In his discussion of whether or not
the institutions, cultures, and processes of national security decisionmaking and policy implementation, and particularly as they enable
the proconsular role, are as functional as they might be, he strongly
reinforces the current consensus. He ruefully notes that while proconsular leadership in the proper sense of the term seems to call for unity
of command in the field, the fundamental problem facing American
proconsuls is that political and military decision making have long been
institutionally split, and still remain so even after the Goldwater-Nichols
reforms of 1986. Here Professor Lord is quite correctly critical, indeed
skeptical, in his assessment: “There is no easy solution to his problem.”
That said, however he does include a very thoughtful set of ruminations
on the urgent necessity to rethink fundamentally the role of our regional
unified commands, and as well the often-adapted Unified Command
Plan which defines them.
While no book can be extended to all of the logical implications of
its main thesis, I find one omission to be worth noting. Given his own
experiences and the richness of the research into individual proconsuls,
their successes and failure, it would have been helpful for Professor Lord
to have advanced his own ideas on the needed professional development
of such future leaders, both civilian and military. To this reader, it is but
one more area in which Professor Lord’s conclusion is apt: “Suffice it
to say, proconsular leadership, which so plainly offers danger as well as
opportunity, is an instrument in need of adult supervision at the imperial
center.”
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Skin in the Game: Poor Kids and Patriots
By Dennis Laich
Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and
Their Country
By Andrew J. Bacevich
Bloomington, IN: iUniverse,
2013
192 pages
$28.95

New York: Metropolitan
Books, 2013
256 pages
$26.00

Reviewed by Charles D. Allen, Colonel (USA Retired), Professor of Leadership
and Cultural Studies, US Army War College

T

hese two books approach the same topic, the all-volunteer force,
from different analytic perspectives. While the term all-volunteer
force is meant to include all armed services, the focus of these works
is the service with the largest manpower component, the United States
Army. Preserving the nation’s security is a critical issue in this age of
fiscal austerity facing the US government amid the struggles within the
Congress, its political parties, and the executive branch. The challenge is
to manage the national debt while providing for the security of American
citizens. All indications point toward significant near-term reductions in
Department of Defense budgets with resulting cutbacks in manpower,
modernization, and readiness. The US military consumes over fifty
percent of the discretionary spending of the federal government. Absent
existential threats, it should be scrutinized for funding cuts.
Laich retired as a major general in the Army Reserve after 35 years
of service; he held command at colonel and flag officer ranks. Bacevich
graduated from West Point and was commissioned an armored officer;
he rose to command the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Upon military
retirement, Bacevich earned a Princeton PhD and recently retired as
a professor of history and international relations at Boston University.
Ironically, both authors have inherited Smedley’s syndrome from “War
is a Racket.” Bacevich opens Chapter 8 with the description of a senior
officer who, “in retirement defects…calling into questions officially
sanctioned truths…[a]fter a decade of unquestioning subservience to
the national security state” (115).
In this case, the “officially sanctioned truth” is the success of the
all-volunteer force as a highly professional force, vastly superior to the
conscripted force it replaced in July 1973. Laich and Bacevich served in
the Vietnam-era draft Army, then during the presumptive validation of
the all-volunteer force in the Persian Gulf War. National security professionals and military members of the touted all-volunteer force will find
portions of these books difficult to accept since their core identities and
motivations are under assault. Military readers will probably find convenient scapegoats in the civilian and political leaders whom they believe
tend to overcommit the force—or with the citizens who go shopping
while service members go to war on their behalf.
In Skin in the Game, Laich offers a simple framework with which
to evaluate the all-volunteer force—fairness, efficiency, and sustainability.
His assessment is presented rhetorically, and he offers the following
disclaimer in the Preface: “This book is not intended to be a rigorous
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academic product or a reference source. In fact, it could be characterized as a very long op-ed piece intended to promote dialogue” (xiii).
The reader must keep this disclaimer in mind as Laich provides a brief
summary of the development of the all-volunteer force at the close of
the Vietnam War, which he regards as a political expedient of President
Nixon. Most informative is his presentation of the rationale conveyed by
the Gates Commission, which Nixon directed to examine the alternative
to conscription. Along with the objectives, assumptions, and nine objections for the all-volunteer force, Laich provides his view of the “reality”
that has transpired over the past four decades since the all-volunteer
force’s inception. Laich believes that the all-volunteer force is not fair
since people across the social economic spectrum do not serve equally
(all-volunteer force soldiers are “poor kids and patriots”). It is also inefficient because the Army has outsourced some logistics and security
competencies to private corporations to conduct its recent operations.
Lastly, the all-volunteer force is not sustainable because of prohibitive
personnel costs required to recruit and retain active component service
members. Those costs include paying for rehabilitation from combat
wounds and psychological trauma as well as retirement pensions.
Bacevich’s Breach of Trust provides a much more scholarly treatment;
it continues the arguments of his previous works The New American
Militarism (2005) and Washington Rules (2010). Bacevich asserts that the
American way of life and its quest for global preeminence has placed the
nation in a perpetual state of conflict and war. In protecting and projecting US values, national leaders have chosen the military instrument of
national power by default, which in turn requires global presence of its
force. The establishment and evolution of the all-volunteer force enable
this presence. For the US political elite, the all-volunteer force is the
blunt instrument for asserting preeminence: For senior military officers,
the all-volunteer force has become the manifestation of a professional
force with the prized autonomy that it entails.
To quote Shakespeare’s Hamlet, “ay, there’s the rub!” Bacevich
contends that the Departments of Defense and the Army have aligned
with societal views of race, gender, and sexual orientation (most recently
with the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”). Thus, the American public
has little interest or concern about its military, apart from the feel-good
patriotic fanfare at sporting events and occasional encounters with
uniformed service members at airports. The all-volunteer force, with
its complementarity with the National Guard and Reserve forces, was
designed to link US forces with the American people, such that employments of the military would be noticed, felt, and supported by the public.
Alas, that has not been the case, as Rachel Maddow has documented
in Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power (Parameters review,
Summer 2013).
With less than one percent of the US population currently serving,
the all-volunteer force has become separated physically and socially
from the American people. Repeatedly, the civilian political elite has
succumbed to the temptation to assert US preeminence and then used
the nation’s impressive and available military force without constraint or
accountability. While several national polls reflect a US military held in
high esteem, Bacevich contends that it has not been effective in winning
current wars and has abrogated elements of its professional jurisdiction
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to private security organizations. He foresees a bleak future characterized by “more needless wars or shadow conflicts sold by a militarized and
irresponsible political elite; more wars mismanaged by an intellectually
sclerotic and unimaginative senior officer corps; more wars that exact
huge penalties without yielding promised outcomes…” (190). Bacevich
decries the warrior-professional who has supplanted the citizen-soldier
through the “conversion of military service from collective obligation
to personal preference [for service]” (79). Accordingly, Bacevich charges
the nation’s political elites, senior military officers, and disengaged citizenry with a breach of trust with American service members.
Both authors buttress their arguments on the founding documents of our nation—The Declaration of Independence and The US
Constitution. They refer frequently to the principle of no large standing
forces. They assert that greatly reduced numbers in the armed forces
would limit leaders’ desire and ability to launch military operations. To
man the forces needed for peacetime engagement, the authors offer
alternatives to the all-volunteer force, but they are equally pessimistic
about the viability of military conscription. Laich proposes a hybrid of
a draft lottery for the reserve component with the option of enrolling
in college Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs. Bacevich
suggests a two-year requirement for national service that would enhance
citizens’ sense of obligation to contribute to their nation. Any form of
mandatory service would have to provide safeguards against the inequities that have plagued past conscription programs. All citizens must bear
equal risk and share the burden of service.
It is appropriate to evaluate the viability of the all-volunteer force
after its inception forty years ago—especially as we face the uncertainty
of future decades. The strategic question remains a philosophical one:
“What do we want the role of the United States to be in the world?” The
answers to this fundamental query determine the role of U.S. armed
forces, its composition, and the capabilities required to secure national
interests. To inform such discourse, national security professionals and
military members should consider the arguments and recommendations
presented in these two works. Our nation can ill afford a breach of
trust between its citizenry and those who serve to secure their collective
interests.

Generals of the Army: Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower,
Arnold, Bradley
Edited by James H. Willbanks
Reviewed by Major General David T. Zabecki, PhD, USA (Ret.), Honorary
Senior Research Fellow, War Studies Programme, University of Birmingham
(UK)
Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 2013
262 pages
$35.00

I

n 2013, the United States Mint issued a set of commemorative coins
honoring the only five officers to achieve the five-star rank of General
of the Army. The half-dollar coin features Henry H. “Hap” Arnold and
Omar N. Bradley. The dollar features George C. Marshall and Dwight D.
Eisenhower. Douglas MacArthur appears on the five-dollar gold piece.
Authorized by an act of Congress that was sponsored by the US Army
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Command and General Staff College Foundation, the reverse of all three
coins depict designs relating to Fort Leavenworth and the Staff College.
Generals of the Army was written as a companion piece to that
special set of coins. Edited by Professor James H. Willbanks, the General
of the Army George C. Marshal Chair of Military History and Director
of the Department of Military History at CGSC, the book contains a
chapter on each of the five-star generals, with an emphasis on their
Fort Leavenworth experiences. The first chapter, “Officer Education
and the Fort Leavenworth Schools, 1881-1940,” by Jonathan M. House,
is an excellent capsule history of mid-level officer education in the US
Army. That chapter alone is worth the price of the book. Volumes have
been written about each of these US Army legends, and all but Marshall
published their own memoirs. Yet, this handy little single-volume reference provides a tightly written set of profiles for comparing these five
very different careers. Those careers also intertwined in different and
sometimes ironic ways.
Douglas MacArthur never really attended a Leavenworth school;
nor did he formally serve there as an instructor. He did serve as the
commander of an engineer company at Leavenworth, and while there
he lectured informally at the General Services School and the Cavalry
School. Perhaps the most controversial of the major figures of American
military history, MacArthur was the only general officer to serve in three
major wars (World Wars I and II and Korea). He also reached five-star
rank as a field marshal in the Philippine army several years before the
rank existed in the US Army.
George C. Marshall never held a command in combat, but he is
widely recognized as the “Organizer of Victory” in World War II. After
the war, he went on to serve as Secretary of State, and Secretary of
Defense. He received the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in establishing
the Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe. Thanks to his foresight,
Germany today remains one of America’s staunchest allies in the world.
In 1906, Marshall attended the Infantry and Cavalry School (shortly
renamed the School of the Line). Graduating first in his class, he was
selected to attend the Staff College, and then served for two more years
as an instructor in the Staff College’s Department of Engineering.
Although MacArthur was far senior in terms of rank and time in the
service, Marshall was the first army officer appointed to the newly established five-star rank in December 1944—one day after the promotion
of Admiral William D. Lahey, chief of staff to President Roosevelt. As
Secretary of Defense, Marshall in April 1951 supported President Harry
Truman’s decision to relieve MacArthur from his command in Korea.
Marshall also was the only five-star officer who was not a military
academy graduate.
Dwight D. Eisenhower was convinced that his career was on a
dead-end track after he was not assigned overseas during World War
I. Nor had he even attended an officers’ branch school. But thanks to
the mentorship of Major General Fox Conner, Eisenhower attended
CGSC during 1925-26, and graduated first in his class. During the
interwar years, Eisenhower as a major and then a lieutenant colonel
served as MacArthur’s aide-de-camp, first when Macarthur was Chief
of Staff of the Army, and then when MacArthur went to the Philippines.
During World War II, Eisenhower’s rise in rank was meteoric, from
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his promotion to colonel in March 1941 to general of the Army on 20
December 1944. The fact that his former aide received his fifth star only
two days after MacArthur received his, always seemed to be a sore point
with MacArthur. At one point in late 1951, MacArthur was also seen
as Eisenhower’s primary competition for the Republican presidential
nomination.
Hap Arnold was the last promoted of the four original five-star
officers authorized by the Congress for the army. The commander of
US Army Air Forces during World War II, Arnold also was a semiofficial member of the ad hoc Joint Chiefs of Staff. Trained as a pilot in
the school established by the Wright Brothers, Arnold was a life-long
advocate for military aviation. He also had the least promising interwar
career of any World War II senior general. He received less-than-stellar
evaluation reports and, after the court-martial of General Billy Mitchell,
Arnold was exiled to a number of make-work assignments in remote
places. On top of that, he thoroughly hated his time as a student at CSSC
and even considered retiring from the army early because of that experience. Yet he persevered and ultimately presided over history’s biggest
expansion in military aviation. Two years after the US Air Force became
a separate service in 1947, Congress approved changing Arnold’s rank to
General of the Air Force.
Omar N. Bradley was the last American officer promoted to five-star
rank. During World War II, Congress authorized only four five-star positions each for the Army and Navy. But with the conversion of Arnold’s
rank to General of the Air Force in 1949, the Army could argue it had
one allocation left. As the commander of the 12th Army Group during
World War II, the Chief of Staff of the Army succeeding Eisenhower in
1948, and the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley was the
natural choice. He was promoted to General of the Army in September
1950. Like Eisenhower, Bradley did not serve overseas during World
War I. Unlike Arnold, Bradley valued his time as a student at CGSC,
and after graduating he went on to Fort Benning as an instructor at the
Infantry School, where he came to the attention of Marshall who was
then the assistant commandant of the school. In February 1941, Bradley
was promoted to brigadier general, seven months ahead of Eisenhower.
As Chairman of the Joint’s Chiefs of Staff, Bradley supported President
Truman’s decision to relieve MacArthur, an officer who was already a
brigadier general in June 1918 when Bradley was still a captain.
More than sixty years after the last US Army officer was promoted
to five-star rank, Fort Leavenworth remains the crossroads of the US
Army’s officer corps, and almost every senior officer in the last hundred
years has come through one of the Leavenworth Schools. Those who
made it to the five-star level lived in a far different world strategically
and politically than we do today, and the institution they served has
likewise changed in many ways. Yet there remains a core foundation to
the Profession of Arms that is timeless, and today’s offices can still learn
much by studying the careers of those who preceded us—especially
these five.
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Changing Nature of Power
The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields
and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What
It Used to Be
By Moises Naim
Reviewed by Dr. Joel R. Hillison, Colonel (USA Retired), Faculty Instructor,
Department of Distance Education, US Army War College

O

ver the past sixty years, the US military has gotten into the habit of
planning in an unconstrained environment, whether in developing
budgetary requirements or planning for contingencies. This luxury is no
longer feasible. As Winston Churchill is purported to have said, “Now
that we are out of money we have to think.” It is in this context that
Moises Naim’s, The End of Power, should be considered. Moises Naim
is an eminent scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace and former editor of Foreign Policy. His recent book is a thoughtprovoking and insightful examination of the changing nature of power
in today’s world.
As the title suggests, The End of Power suggests that traditional
notions (and levers) of power are outdated: power isn’t what it used to
be. As the extensive literature on globalization has pointed out, power is
becoming more diffuse and accessible. In the complex and volatile world
today, brute force is often ineffective or counterproductive. Traditional
icons in the exercise of power, from presidents to popes, are increasingly
constrained in their ability to translate power into desired outcomes.
As Robert Zoellick mentioned in his Wall Street Journal review of this
book, “seemingly powerful actors in societies have a harder time getting
things done.”
Naim begins with a discussion of power, how to conceptualize it, use
it, and keep it. He does a nice job summarizing the Weberian conception
of power and how bigger became better with regards to the exercise of
power. Max Weber, a famous German social scientist, suggested states
were those entities that maintained a monopoly on the legitimate use of
force within a prescribed boundary. He also advocated stronger, hierarchical bureaucracies as the mechanisms for states to exert authority
and power. Naim explains how this Weberian structure, so successful
after World War I, has begun to crumble. Even as the concentration
of power is increasing in some sectors, the ability to use it to achieve a
desired outcome and the probability of retaining it is more volatile and
uncertain than ever.
Perhaps the most interesting portion of the book is the typology
Naim establishes to categorize how power has transformed with globalization and other recent changes. This typology discusses a tripartite
revolution against the conventional notions and effectiveness of power:
more, mobility, and mentality. The “more” component expounds upon
the growth in actors, ideas, and world population. All of these factors
complicate the possession and exercise of control by more traditional
actors, such as states. In Weber’s world, barriers to entry and the

New York: Basic Books, 2013
320 pages
$27.99

120

Parameters 44(2) Summer 2014

efficiencies of scale reduced the number of potential actors in critical
sectors such as governance and industry. In today’s world, those barriers
have been reduced and the same structures that provided economies
of scale have often hindered the ability to adapt quickly to changing
situations. The “mobility” revolution refers to the expansion of options.
Not only do people and things have greater ability to traverse the globe,
so does information. This revolution has contributed to the reduction of
the barriers to entry discussed above and has allowed a greater number
and diversity of the actors to interact on a local, regional or global level.
Finally, Naim discusses the “mentality” revolution. This development,
closely related to the first two, discusses how rapidly ideas and norms
can proliferate, changing expectations and traditional social contracts.
Again, the revolution is antithetical to the hierarchical structures of
power touted by Weber.
Naim’s argument fits nicely with a much older debate captured by
Jeffrey Issac in his classic, “Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist
Critique.” In that article, a distinction was made between the “power
to” and the “power over.” The three “M” revolutions have increased the
ability of everyone, including nonstate actors, to exert power in ways that
were unimaginable in the past (power to). Inversely, these same revolutions have decreased the ability of traditional power brokers, such as
states and armies, to exercise or sustain power over other actors (power
over). In addition, power has to be considered within the social structures within which humans interact. Thus, the ability to understand and
explain is as important as the ability to do something about the physical
phenomenon. This context coincides with Naim’s call for a “framework
to help make sense of the changes taking place.”
Overall, this book is well-written and readable. Though much of
what is described is well-known, Naim ties it together in an original
and thought-provoking manner. For those interested in the role of landpower, this book provides some exceptional insights in conceptualizing
the roles and functions of the US Army and Marine Corps. If power is
so dispersed and the problems more complex, how should the Army
define its role? Certainly, the military must retain the ability to dominate
other state-based military threats to ensure the nation’s survival and to
promote the vital interests of the country. However, what type of force
structure is needed to give our national leaders the flexibility they need
to respond to the VUCA international system in a resource constrained
environment? If you accept Naim’s conclusions, perhaps the Army’s
fight to maintain end strength is not a realistic or affordable approach
given the “more, mobility, and mentality” revolutions.
This book is also worth reading for foreign policy enthusiasts
and senior political and military leaders who are struggling to develop
effective policies and strategies during times of fiscal constraint. As
the traditional sources and structures of power decay, senior leaders,
policymakers, and strategists have to adapt. Leaders have to be more
comfortable with a lack of direct control. Success will reside in the ability
to monitor and shape ideas associated with the mentality revolution
from the lowest to the very highest levels. Hypocrisy and mistakes will
be quickly identified and disseminated by various actors. While the military should retain those capabilities where it maintains a comparative
advantage, such as strategic mobility, it must look for more alternative
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solutions to the problems at hand. Knowing the limitations of military
power might be just as important as knowing its capabilities.

Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama
by Stephen Sestanovich
Reviewed by Colonel Michael J. Daniels, student, US Army War College

T

he recent spate of writing decrying the decline of American power
and influence centers on issues of domestic decay and turmoil, with
the view that the United States has somehow lost its way in the world.
Some authors argue these domestic political, economic, and social challenges have hamstrung the current administration in pursuing the kind of
aggressive, engaged foreign policy needed in this volatile time. Stephan
Sestanovich, author of Maximalist, shows the current challenges of the
Obama administration are not new, but part of a cycle that can be traced
back to the post-World War II Truman administration.
Sestanovich is a former US diplomat, who served under both
Presidents Reagan and Clinton. He is currently a professor of international relations at Columbia, as well as a senior fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations. Sestanovich has written a highly-readable and thorough history of US foreign policy since 1947. The book does not offer
much in the way of new research or detail. However, the author succeeded in repackaging previous works and incorporating a great many
anecdotes to retell this story with a slightly new twist. It is a worthy addition to US foreign policy scholarship, and should be read by any serious
student of diplomatic history, or for anyone in a position to advise on or
craft future foreign policy.
The book expands on the author’s earlier thesis, regarding the
“maximalist” tradition in US foreign policy, one advanced in a Spring
2005 article in The National Interest. Sestanovich, describes foreign
policy and diplomacy in a continuum cycling between periods of
maximalism and retrenchment. One criticism of the book is the author
never defines these two terms, which are so central to his argument.
The reader quickly summarizes that maximalism equals overreach,
with retrenchment the “do less” corollary that follows when America
must pick up the pieces. The author details the approach administrations have taken cycling between these two extremes: the maximalist
Truman followed by a retrenching Eisenhower; who is then followed by
maximalist Kennedy/Johnson administrations; then by a long period of
retrenchment under presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter; the maximalism
of Reagan; a pause in the cycle under presidents George H.W. Bush and
Clinton; the maximalism of George W. Bush; and finally this current
period of retrenchment under President Obama.
A few unanswered questions linger below the surface of a linear
story long on narrative but short on analysis. My central criticism is
the cycle is described as far too simplistic. Can any administration be
categorized as purely maximalist or retrenching? The author concedes
most administrations made decisions and set policies that ran counter
to the general direction of their foreign policy. These decisions were
almost always influenced by external events, beyond the influences of
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the president and his team of advisors. Sestanovich was unable to categorize the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations cleanly for
these very reasons, and the author notes it was not President George
W. Bush’s initial intent to be a maximalist. The second- and third-order
effects of policy decisions are often to blame for these shifts. The decisions of our partners and allies, unforeseen world events, and black
swans such as 9-11 are also responsible for shifts in focus. Campaign
rhetoric and an administration’s “going-in position” rarely survive first
contact with future realities. The author would have been better served
to incorporate more of this dynamic into his analysis, and to examine
why presidents seem so often to misjudge or fail to anticipate events that
shake their preferred interrelationship with the world.
Sestanovich spends most of the book examining the foreign policy
realm of presidential decision making, and what drives administrations to “go large” or “go small” when pursuing national interests and
exporting American values. This examination is interesting but it is also
incomplete. Sestanovich, like many other scholars, fails to account for
domestic political dynamics and issues that influence our ability to act
globally. It is as if the author believes international credibility trumps
domestic will. This Innenpolitik—Realpolitik interplay and tension—
best explained in Peter Trubowitz’s book Politics and Strategy, is
ground-zero for grand strategic development. Just as unforeseen events
abroad can derail foreign policy, so too domestic challenges will often
cause an administration to be more inward-focused. Sestanovich’s argument would have been strengthened by acknowledging this relationship
and implicitly weaving more examples throughout his narrative.
The author’s lack of detailed analysis weakens his argument that the
United States must remain actively engaged in the world, and be more
a maximalist than a retrencher. Sestanovich never convinces the reader
why a more balanced and pragmatic policy position, similar to that taken
by the Obama administration, can be an effective, or at least a suitable
course for present realities. These criticisms aside, Maximalist remains
an excellent history of US foreign policy, and provides yet another lens
through which to view presidential decision-making in the modern era.
Future policy makers, politicians and strategists would do well to take
note.
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Financial War
Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial
Warfare
By Juan Zarate
Reviewed by David Katz

I

n Treasury’s War, Juan Zarate, a former Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime and federal prosecutor, earnestly presents an insider’s view of the US Treasury’s response
to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In all, this book is an important, enjoyable
and often contradictory history vital to understanding the contemporary
US practice of financial-based power projection, and the Treasury’s new
role in national security.
The author begins with a brief introduction to the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC), which is “the US government’s primary tool for
going after the assets of enemy regimes” domiciled within Washington’s
jurisdiction, as well as prohibiting American citizens, banks, or businesses
from transacting with Specially Designated Nationals, (individuals,
businesses, groups or entities) sanctioned by law. North Korea, Cuba
and Iran were all subject to lawful economic sanctions, administered by
Treasury prior to 9/11.
Mr. Zarate’s “Treasury tale” begins after 9/11 with three lawyers,
Treasury General Counsel David Aufhauser, his Deputy George Wolfe
and Chief Adviser Bill Fox, crafting the contours of what would become
Executive Order 13224, authorizing Treasury to designate administratively the financial enablers of terrorism and, more importantly, those
associated with them. Zarate, a Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary
of the Treasury for Enforcement, ran the Executive Office for Terrorist
Financing and Financial Crimes, which was combined with the Treasury
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, making him the first Assistant
Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes.
With the stage set, the book’s second half details Treasury’s warfare.
Directed by Executive Order 13224 and armed with section 311 of the
Patriot Act (2001), Treasury began administratively designating enablers
and associates of sanctioned entities in 2005. Weighing the risk of
becoming an “associate” and losing access to US markets, many banks
and insurance companies cut off relationships with sanctioned entities isolating them from the global financial system. Outside US legal
authority or enforcement, designated entities were frozen out of global
markets by international actions in what Zarate termed a “virtuous
cycle of self-isolation.” By all accounts, it was highly successful. From
there, Treasury was off to the races designating Iranian persons, banks
and shipping companies, Lebanese banks, Al Qaeda, Al Shaabab and
Taliban financiers, and Russian criminal networks, among others. Along
the way, the Treasury became the center of gravity for US financial-based
power projection and the de-facto, but explicit, system administrator for
global finance.
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Zarate’s history clearly conveys the intent of Treasury’s approach.
As such, Treasury’s War should be required reading for policy makers.
However, with a decade of on-the-ground policy implementation,
Treasury’s War should be more than a triumphal recitation. Mr. Zarate’s
assessments of the efficiency, efficacy, coherence and limitations of
Treasury’s policy would have strengthened the book. The most serious,
yet unspoken, limitation of Treasury’s approach is that it does not project
power. It works by reduction, isolating US finance from designated entities and their associates. The logical endpoint of any such system is US
self-isolation, not power projection. Secondly, created and administered
by lawyers and prosecutors, Treasury’s approach maintains the petite
fiction of domestic legality when, in fact, the policy was designed to
operate beyond US legal jurisdiction where informal American diplomatic influence has failed. Additionally, much of Treasury’s War operates
on an administrative basis, not a legal basis. The US government can
designate entities administratively and is not required to demonstrate
whether target has either specific knowledge or intent beforehand.
Regardless of the legal terminology, framework, or perspective of the
participants and their talk of pursuing international scofflaws, it is an
exercise in US power projection not criminal enforcement. Lastly, the
book leaves one Rubicon uncrossed. Treasury’s War describes systemic
manipulation of the global financial system for US objectives. Systems
are dynamic, adaptive, and adopt new equilibria as a result of interventions or shocks; otherwise they do not survive. The balance between
specific intervention versus system regulation remains an open question.
The book’s last chapter, “The Coming Financial Wars,” looks at
some emerging challenges to Treasury’s war and serves as the basis for
Zarate’s Parameters article (Winter 2013-14). The author approaches the
finite future of both the dollar as world reserve currency and American
as financial hegemon with a touch of melancholy. This approach leaves
unanswered the question of how the United States will continue to
harness international financial self-interest to its national policy aims.
He approaches networked asset creation—companies such as Facebook,
Google, and Bitcoin, which create value by their network and network
position and not of themselves—as problems to solve not horses to
harness. It is a decidedly twentieth century perspective. To give Zarate
his due, the epilogue of Treasury’s War contains nuanced musings on the
role and limits of national power projection through financial means.
Those questions and his answers deserve expansion into another book.

Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First
World War
By Nicholas A. Lambert
Reviewed by Sarandis Papadopoulos, Ph.D., principal co-author Pentagon
9/11 and Secretariat Historian, Department of the Navy
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N

aval power in the First World War seemingly served only defensive
purposes. Fleets protected Entente trade, while German U-boats
tried to stifle delivery of supplies. The Dardanelles campaign, the failed
naval attempt to bypass deadlock in France and Flanders, sought to buttress Russia with equipment and keep it in the war. During the conflict,
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this argument goes, blockade predictably weakened Germany slowly, but
only four years of land warfare clinched victory.
Nicholas Lambert now convincingly argues the Royal Navy instead
perceived “economic warfare” as a way to trigger quick collapse. Drawing
from his 1998 Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, Lambert traces the service’s
understanding that a “close” blockade of German ports would be hopeless in the face of new mine, torpedo and submarine threats, but then
sought other measures. After evaluating British vulnerability during the
1905 Moroccan Crisis, the Navy recognized economic warfare’s potential to deprive Germany of materiel and financing. Exploiting Britain’s
central position at the world’s shipping, communications (telegraph
cables), insurance (Lloyd’s) and banking systems offered to deter the
Kaisereich or quickly defeat it. By 1912 the Cabinet-level Committee on
Imperial Defence had “pre-delegated” authority to embargo trade and
credit to Germany, allowing initiation of sanctions the day war started
on 5 August 1914 (178).
Once the world war began, however, market panic worked too
well alongside these measures. The July war scare, with August’s tight
wartime British controls, froze credit worldwide with investors buying
gold or Sterling; every stock exchange closed (187). The plunging US
dollar forced Treasury Secretary William McAdoo to shutter Wall Street
for four months as the market for American cotton collapsed weeks
before mid-term Congressional elections. Despite government guarantees for London banks’ payment instruments, “bills of exchange,”
international commerce halted and employers laid-off workers, raising
the specter of domestic revolution in many countries.
Economic warfare had run off the rails and the British pulled
back to mitigate its consequences. The period to February 1916 saw
arguments on limited blockade. For Lambert, the adversaries were the
Admiralty on one side (albeit with differing views within the service),
with the Foreign Office, War Office (Army) and Board of Trade (the
economics and merchant shipping ministry) generally on the other.
Each agency played a role in counting or controlling trade flow into
Germany’s neutral neighbors, but faced difficulties in so doing. All
leaders ultimately realized the lure of wartime profit was not limited to
Swedish, Danish or Dutch re-export businesses, nor to American oil
firms, but to British shipping companies as well. Economic warfare, a
key ingredient of an “off-shore balancing” strategy some describe today,
needed stringency to function, a non-existent commodity until 1916.
To be fair, politics compelled behavior contradictory to waging war.
Merchant firms, and the Board of Trade, fiercely rejected government
meddling in the free market even to prevent shipments to the enemy.
Despite repeated reports of goods being re-exported to Germany, the
Foreign Office sought to appease neutrals, hoping they would voluntarily stop trade with the Central Powers through quotas on cargoes.
The War Office needed to mobilize arms and food, as well as conscript
personnel, which threatened domestic British political stability (332).
The Royal Navy intercepted blockade runners, only to see British Prize
Courts refuse to “condemn” cargoes because ownership could not be
proven, allowing the merchant vessels to resume passage even when carrying supplies the Kaisereich needed. Atop it all, Asquith’s parliamentary
coalition could collapse if any these constituencies withdrew support.
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Only continued failure on the battlefield and the 1916 conscription
crisis created the circumstances needed for economic warfare to begin
in earnest.
Researched to the limits of remaining sources, Planning Armageddon
is complex. It needs a close reading to master its myriad issues and many
characters, civilian and military, whose roles changed over a decade.
Cruiser operations for sanction enforcement are tangential here, more
the backdrop to Cabinet debate and international diplomacy. But the
book profitably uncovers key elements. Despite war’s public approval
in 1914, British firms traded across the North Sea for eighteen months.
Britain attacked the Dardanelles in 1915 not simply to equip the Czar’s
armies, but to allow export of Russian wheat to stabilize domestic grain
prices (320). Most centrally, in 1912 the British government authorized
the Royal Navy to win a war quickly, a decisive “Schlieffen Plan” from
the sea, (1) before its 1914 decision to put the British Expeditionary Force
into France. That neither the navy nor the government it served properly calculated the measures needed to make economic warfare work
reflected the real height of the goals they sought. Strategic planners
seeking to arrange the same methods in future conflicts ought to read
this book and bear such needs in mind.
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Cartels & Gangs
The Cartels: The Story of Mexico’s Most Dangerous Criminal
Organizations and Their Impact on U.S. Security
By George W. Grayson
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva
Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

T

he Cartels, written by George Grayson, a noted expert on Mexico
and Emeritus Professor at the College of William & Mary, is a noholds barred expose of the criminal violence, corruption, and crisis of
governance gripping Mexico. The author has over two-hundred research
trips to Latin America, two recent books on the topic—one focusing on
Los Zetas (2012; with Sam Logan) and the other on narco-violence and
Mexican failed state potentials (2010)—and three recent US Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, monographs concerning La Familia
cartel (2010), the rise of vigilantism (2011), and Felipe Calderón’s policies
influencing the Mexican armed forces (2013). The reviewer, having read
all of these more specialized works, can see where material has been
drawn from them for this new endeavor. This book, in fact, can be considered Dr. Grayson’s production of a more generalized work on the
subject much akin to Sylvia Longmire’s Cartel (2011), Paul Rexton Kan’s
Cartels at War (2012), and Ioan Grillo’s El Narco (2012).
The work, which was published at the end of 2013, draws upon
very up-to-date Spanish and English language works, interviews, and
email correspondence providing as current a picture as possible when it
went to press. It is composed of preface and acknowledgements, introduction, ten chapters, thirteen appendices, notes, selected bibliography,
and an index. Its chapters can be grouped into four basic themes, each
of which will be discussed in turn. The first theme, comprising the
introduction and Chapter 1, is that of the historical era when drug traffickers were subordinate to an autocratic state. It begins with the story
of Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) and his Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) successors through Ernesto Zedillo (ending
Nov 2000). The rise of Miguel “El Padrino” Gallardo and the relationship of traffickers to the government are also discussed along with the fact
that, if the rules were not followed, enforcer teams would be dispatched
from Mexico City to levy PRI extra-judicial justice. The second theme,
comprising Chapters 2-4, is that of the transitional era in Colombia,
South Florida, and Mexico when the fortunes of the Colombian cartels
waned and the Mexican cartels become ascendant. It chronicles the shift
in cocaine flow from Florida to Mexico and then provides information
on the Gulf, Los Zetas, Sinaloa, Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO),
Juárez, La Familia (Knights Templars), and Arellano Félix Organization
(AFO) cartels. Also covered is the National Action Party (PAN) policy
shift—under Vicente Fox (Dec 2000-Nov 2006)—of no longer sending
out governmental kill-teams to punish traffickers who got out of line.
The resulting second-order effects, along with other factors, inadvertently contributed to the power balance reversal between the cartels and
the federal government.

Santa Barbara: Praeger
Security International, 2013
328 pages
$63.00
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The third theme, comprising Chapters 5-6, focuses on the Calderón
era (Dec 2006-Nov 2012). It is one of direct confrontation, with the
cartels spurred on by the increasing national security threat they represented to the Mexican state. This second PAN administration’s approach,
one with a kingpin strategy focus, reliance on the armed forces, and
close coordination with the United States, is highlighted. The experiences of the Mexican military are also chronicled; as a mission for which
they were ill prepared to undertake as well as the impacts, including
human rights abuses, this has had on Mexican society. Military engagements (firefights and arrests) with municipal and state police forces in
the pay of the cartels are also detailed. The final theme, comprising
Chapters 7-10, is on the present administration of Enrique Peña Nieto
(Dec 2012-Current). This new administration has engaged in campaign
ploys—like the stillborn Gendarmería Nacional program—and media
spin, downplaying the extent of the cartel threat, to further its public
image and Machiavellian agendas for the benefit of the PRI now once
again in power. The increasing rise of vigilantism in Mexico is also
covered within this theme along with the enablers of organized crime
which include elements of the Church, banking and business interests,
and Mexican state governors, whom (due to the executive-legislative
impasse in Mexico City since the late 1990s) have increasingly gained
in political power and wealth, resulting in their either looking the other
way or directly colluding with the cartels.
Many of components of the work are highly informative and provide
great insights into the relationships and animosities of the cartels to the
Mexican government under the various administrations—both PRI and
PAN—and to each other. Further, the writing benefits from Grayson’s
approach to categorizing information in such a way that it is easily
digestible. For instance, the table with the “Ten Commandment’s of ‘El
Padrino”’ (23) is extremely useful in showing the subordination of the
narco-syndicates to the old PRI political machine. Of note from this
table is how executions of opposing traffickers were to take place north
of the US border, if possible (Commandment 4)—what we would call
spillover. Yet, American civilians were not to be kidnapped, extorted,
or killed either south or north of the border so as not to incur the wrath
of the US government (Commandment 5). Other tables show us the
differences between the drug wars in Colombia and Mexico (96), a
general history of drug activities (228-232), and military desertion rates
in Mexico—which between 1997 and 2012 number over two-hundred
and twenty thousand personnel and beg the question how many of these
individuals have gone over to the cartels (264).
Criticism, of what is otherwise an excellent overview of the recent
history of the Mexican cartels and their interrelationship to Mexican
politics, focuses on the fact that quite a few typos can be found within its
pages; better proofing would have been beneficial. The work is also thin
on analyzing cartel impacts on US security, making that part of the subtitle a misnomer. About two pages discuss corruption of US personnel
(209-211) while the Mérida Initiative, from which the new PRI administration has distanced itself, is mentioned in more sections of the book
(93-104, 175-176) additional analysis of its and other impacts seemed
warranted. While it is recognized that Mexico is the major transit point
of illicit narcotics flow into the United States and anything negative
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taking place in Mexico—such as loss of territories, ongoing corruption
and violence, and regional failure due to cartel activities may have a
direct US homeland security impact—some sort of focused discussion
of these threats vis-à-vis Peña Nieto’s policies in the conclusion would
have been beneficial to the reader.
Still, in summation, The Cartels is a well-researched and highly readable work that would make for an excellent college textbook and be
of interest to more general readers such as military officers and policy
makers interested in this subject matter. The various tables and many
appendices for organizing information are also useful. The work very
much deserves its rightful place in both personal and college libraries
next to other general works published on the Mexican cartels over the
last few years.

Studies in Gangs and Cartels
By Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan
Reviewed by José de Arimatéia da Cruz, Professor of International Relations
and Comparative Politics at Armstrong Atlantic State University, Savannah, GA
and Visiting Research Professor at the US Army War College

S

tudies in Gangs and Cartels is written by two eminent scholars in the
field of law enforcement and transnational criminal organizations.
Robert J. Bunker was a Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva
Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College; while John
P. Sullivan is a career police officer and an Adjunct Researcher at the
Scientific Vortex Foundation, Bogotá, Colombia. This important work is
the culmination of the authors’ works from the mid-1990s to the present
with new chapters written specifically for this anthology. Readers will see
the progression of gangs and cartels and their nefarious activities from
third-generation or third-phase cartel typologies.
Studies in Gangs and Cartels addresses the broader challenges gangs
and organized crime can present to states. (1) Gangs and cartels in the
twenty-first century have become more than an annoyance to governmental authorities and law enforcement agencies. Crime and criminally
illicit activities have become more global in scope and can destroy the
social fabric of a society while also undermining the authority and
legitimacy of a state. One only has to think of the current situations
in Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil to realize the impact of criminal elements in society and its detrimental effects. As Bunker and Sullivan
point out, “extending their reach and influence by co-opting individuals and organizations through bribery, coercion and intimidation to
facilitate, enhance, and protect their activities, transnational criminal
organizations are emerging as a serious impediment to democratic governance and a free market economy. This danger is particularly evident
in Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, and other parts of the former
Soviet Union where corruption has become particularly insidious and
pervasive” (63). The traditional view of crime as a localized issue and
therefore a concern only to the police on the beat is no longer valid in
the twenty-first century. As Bunker and Sullivan argue, “rather than
being viewed only as misguided youth or opportunistic criminals or,
in their mature forms, as criminal organizations with no broader social
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or political agenda, more evolved gangs and cartels are instead seen as
developing political, mercenary, and state-challenging capabilities” (xi).
Criminal organizations and cartels are emerging phenomena of the
third-generation street gang typology advanced in the Studies in Gangs and
Cartels. According to Bunker and Sullivan, third-generation gangs have
sophisticated political aims. “They operate—or seek to operate—at
the global end of the spectrum, using their sophistication to gain and
secure power, drive financial acquisition, and engage in mercenary-type
activities” (3). This proliferation of street-level gangs across neighborhoods, cities, and countries is partially a consequence of the process of
globalization, that is, the greater interconnection of the world due to
advancements in transportation, economics, the death of distance facilitated by the internet, and interdependence. In the globalized world of the
twenty-first century, gangs have become transnational when the following characteristics are present. First, the criminal organization is active
and operational in more than one country. Second, criminal operations
committed by gangsters in one country are planned, directed, and controlled by leadership in another country. Third, criminal organizations
are mobile and adapt to new areas of operations. Finally, their criminal
activities and enterprises are sophisticated and transcend borders (3-4).
In the globalized post-Cold War world of the twenty-first century,
gangs and cartels represent a “new warrior class” (41). The “new warrior
class” includes those individuals in society, part of the “bottom billion,”
who have lost all hope of a better future and social advancement, and use
force to partake in the spoils of society. As Bunker and Sullivan point
out, individuals alienated from the rule of law will provide the basis of
the new threat to the nation-state (41). As eminent military historian
Marin van Creveld points it out in The Transformation of War: The Most
Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz (1991), “in the
future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today
call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly
hit on more formal titles to describe themselves” (Martin van Creveld,
The Transformation of War, 197). As Paul Rexton Kan noted, “drug-fueled
conflicts often produce a wartime economy alongside local disempowerment and steadily diminishing political stability and personal security”
(Paul Rexton Kan, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare, 93). This new class of
“warrior,” the disenfranchised of society, will likely fill the ranks-andfiles of private military companies in order to participate in the spoils of
war. Gangs and cartels in the post-Cold War international system, are
“a potential conflict generator: not only do they contribute to violence
in their home community, but given the confluence of a number of
factors they could well emerge as a true threat to national security” (55).
Examples of gangs and cartels as potential conflict generators abound,
but the cases of Sierra Leon, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Mexico, and Brazil are worth mentioning. Third-generation
gangs and cartels are not only proliferating in the post-Cold War international system, but their methods and techniques in the war making
process are also becoming more lethal and more daring. Gangs and
cartels “challenge states in several ways. They undermine the rule of
law, break the state monopoly on use of force, and foster corruption and
insecurity” (186).



Book Reviews: Cartels & Gangs

131

In conclusion, I highly recommend this work to students and academics in the field of political science and criminal justice as well as the
military, especially the US Army, which may be called upon to address
the drug trafficking in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil. I also recommend this work to law enforcement agencies dealing with the new
disease of the twenty-first century: third-generation gangs and cartels.
In the final analysis, it is wise to remember the words of Hannah Arendt:
“The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the
most probable change is to a more violent world” (60).
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Stability & Instability
Where is the Lone Ranger? America’s Search for a Stability
Force, 2nd ed.
By Robert M. Perito
Reviewed by Gordon Rudd, Professor, US Marine School of Advanced
Warfighting (SAW)

Washington, DC: United
Institute for Peace Press,
2013
247 pages
$24.95

D

espite an awkward title, this book makes an indisputable case for
interim law enforcement when a failed state is occupied (or liberated) by a military coalition. Robert Perito, a retired Foreign Service
Officer, who had a tour with the Department of Justice International
Criminal Investigative Training Program, argues that the United States
should create a standing constabulary force to manage the disorder and
violence in post-conflict situations, such as those encountered in the
past few decades. He uses four case studies to illustrate the scope of
the law enforcement problem: Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, he does not provide any detail or design for an American
solution.
A description of the French Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri, and
Spanish Guardia Nationale identifies national police forces that can be
mobilized with cohesion and deployed as para-military formations to
provide law enforcement and training. Such forces are normally under
the control of each country’s respective Ministry of Interior, for which
the United States has no counterpart. The US Department of Interior
operates the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
and the Forrest Service; it does not have a national police force. When
the United States has contributed to an international police component,
it has been an ad hoc collection of city police officers, deputy sheriffs,
and highway patrolmen who lack common training, procedures, equipment, and rank structure.
In response to the Bosnian Civil War, a NATO-led Implementation
Force (IFOR) was activated in 1995. Ambassador Holbrooke, the
American diplomat who managed the Dayton Accords which led to
IFOR, argued for an armed and forceful coalition police force. He was
opposed by his European counterparts who did not want an aggressive
police component in Bosnia without a new constitution and legal system
within which it could work. Ironically, American military planners also
objected to a robust police capacity that might compete with the military
coalition going into Bosnia. The result was a modest, unarmed, ad hoc
police component that arrived in Bosnia six months after IFOR intervened, with the capacity only to advise the abusive ethnic-based local
police forces. The gap between the local police and IFOR occupation
forces led to frequent violence and continued ethnic abuses, with IFOR
military forces reluctant to take on police tasks.
In August 1998, the coalition deployed a 350-person police component (later expanded to 750) to Bosnia based around an Italian Carabinieri
battalion that could take on more aggressive constabulary tasks, a proficient formation that might have been established earlier. When a smaller
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coalition military force entered Kosovo in 1999 to provide stabilization,
it included a comparable Italian Carabinieri battalion as a base for 350person police formation to serve in the constabulary role.
In 2003, the Bush Administration dismissed lessons from Bosnia
and Kosovo when it invaded Iraq without a police component to provide
interim law enforcement or to help reform the Iraqi police forces. Officials
in the State and Justice Departments knew better and argued for standing up an appropriate police component before the military invasion, but
Secretary Rumsfeld and others in the Administration would not provide
the funding and believed the Iraqis would use their liberation to reform
the police on their own. When that did not happen and Ambassador
Bremer fired 30,000 members of the Ba’athist Party and disbanded the
Iraqi Army (400,000 soldiers), the American-led coalition encountered
a perfect storm of violent instability for which it was ill prepared. Not
until 2007 were the Italian Carabinieri again called upon to form a paramilitary police component to assist with stability operations.
In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
was deployed in 2002 with 5,000 troops and a modest German police
element to help reform the Afghan police. When internal conflicts
demanded more soldiers and police, the American military component
quickly formed, trained, and employed additional army and police
forces. The large scope of that program provided substantial numbers of
Afghan police with limited training, which failed to make it an effective
force. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan poor planning for the law enforcement followed by excessive police expansion without limited training
produced an inadequate police force grappling with continued violence
and instability.
Each case study makes a compelling argument for early planning
in a post-conflict situation for a robust interim law enforcement component to provide stability, and to help rebuild and reform local police
forces. Paramilitary police such as the Italian Carabinieri have proved
effective for such a role. Perito laments the reluctance on the part of
each coalition to provide military forces with the authority to exercise
law enforcement. That seems to argue for the establishment of martial
law by the military occupation force.
Perito’s plea to stand up an American counterpart to the Carabinieri
is vague in design and not probable during a period of military austerity.
But such a component may exist now in the American military structure.
The United States Army has five deployable military police brigades and
16 military police battalions; in addition, there are about as many military police brigades and battalions in the National Guard and Reserves.
There is a military police training brigade with three training battalions
at the Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Properly
packaged, large Army military police formations should be properly
prepared to engage in the constabulary role identified.
In an era where post-conflict is engaged with coalition formations,
it is improbable that the United States would take on such a task alone;
thus, the Lone Ranger theme seems inappropriate. Nor is it probable
that the Army would stand up a new single purpose constabulary formation while reducing force structure. It would make more sense to
employ the military police formations the Army has now in better ways.
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The importance of their tasks may be the best reason to protect those
military police formations as Army force structure is reduced.

Improving the U.S. Military’s Understanding of Unstable
Environments Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups:
Insights from Social Science
By David E. Thaler, Ryan Andrew Brown, Gabriella C. Gonzalez,
Blake W. Mobley, and Parisa Roshan
Santa Monica: RAND, Arroyo
Center, 2013
116 pages
$27.95 paper/Free
Download

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva
Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

T

he research report Improving the US Military’s Understanding of Unstable
Environments Vulnerable to Violent Extremist Groups by the RAND
Arroyo Center is a densely packed—yet extremely well executed—and
timely work of great strategic interest to Army thinkers and students of
irregular warfare. The Army sponsored this research under contract, and
while drawing upon the social sciences, the product is meant ultimately to
facilitate practical and proactive application by the United States and her
partners. Specifically, it applies to “Phase 0” operations, that is, the preconflict phase that “minimizes both cost and the need for intervention
with U.S. ground forces” (xiii).
The research is a great complement to the ongoing Office of the
Secretary of Defense Minerva Initiative—though not a component of
that program—and documents the progressive Center for Army Analysis
commissioned study “Improving Understanding of the Environment of
Irregular Warfare” from mid-2011 to mid-2012. I was very motivated to
analyze and critique this report because its focus—the problematic issue
of host environments creating and sustaining violent nonstate actors—
played prominently in my earlier Parameters Winter 2013-14 essay.
The report identified twelve factors associated with environments
vulnerable to conflict (key concepts only): (1) external support; (2) government is considered illegitimate or ineffective; (3) history of resisting
state rule; (4) poverty and inequality; (5) local government is fragmented,
weak, or vulnerable; (6) ungoverned space; (7) multiple violent, nonstate
groups competing for power; (8) the level of government restriction on
political or ideological dissent; (9) the level of consistency and/or agreement; (10) groups perceive faltering government commitment; (11) the
capacity, resources, and expertise of violent extremist groups; and (12)
social networks. These factors are said to be neither static nor disconnected. They and their interactions were then applied to two conflict
case studies, selected by the sponsoring agency due to their familiarity,
as proofs of concept—the Shining Path in Peru (1980-1992) and the
Maoist insurgency in Nepal (1997-2006).
With the admission that “…measuring factors related to environments vulnerable to insurgency and terrorism is exceedingly difficult,”
(47) the study then goes on to create metrics (quantitative and qualitative) for detecting and assessing factors along with metric justification
and data sources (47-58). Seven key research findings are then provided
in paragraph form (59-60) that go into Army doctrinal views on this
subject matter and social science utility to irregular warfare. More
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importantly for the warfighter—or in this instance the peacebringer,
four action recommendations for the US Army defense community are
then provided:
•• Incorporate factors and associated metrics into irregular warfarerelated analytic games and models.
•• Evaluate levels of potential instability and extremist violence using the
assessment scheme outlined in this report.
•• Conduct research to probe and map overlays and interrelationships
among factors in specific cases.
•• Develop a prioritization approach based on the factors and assessment
scheme that helps indicate where best to allocate analytic and security
assistance resources (xv).
The report also offers appendices including the “Factor Matrix”
and factor presence in the thirty RAND case studies and the useful
inverse COIN factors (countermeasures to insurgencies) (87-88).
My impressions of the research report (written by a very talented
and eclectic team of social scientists) are highly favorable. It was a joy
to read and the recommendations are timely and well measured. Plenty
of time, effort, and resources went into this project and it shows. This
form of research is critical to our gaining a better understanding of the
unstable environments that create and nurture violent extremist groups
and other armed non-state actors.
A few impressions really hit the reviewer while analyzing the
RAND report. What was found fascinating in the report is the inherent tension between old and new forms of insurgency. While the thirty
detailed COIN case studies used for validation purposes all fall under
the political insurgency paradigm, five of the factor examples are from
Mexico and are cartel and gang—mostly Los Zetas—related (Factors 3,
6, 7, 9, & 11), which fall under the organized crime/criminal insurgency
paradigm. This is a paradigm considered antithetical to more mainstream and traditionalist COIN perceptions. Further, while Factor 1
which addresses external support (eg. money, weapons) may be integral
to political insurgencies, criminal actors draw their resources directly
from the illicit economy such as narcotics trafficking, local taxation via
extortion, and related activities. This variable is partially captured in
Factor 11 concerning resources available to a group, but its importance
appears to be understated especially when illicit economies in the tens
of billions of dollars help to sustain such criminal actors.
Given that criminal entities are growing in strength and capability
(as many regions of Latin America attest) it is the impression of this
reviewer that follow-on research conducted by the Arroyo Center on
unstable environments would greatly increase the relevance and utility
of the product. It would be helpful to model the factors indicative to such
threat groups along with the more traditional violent (political) extremist forms and the hybrid (convergence) entities now rising. Additionally,
while the reviewer agrees that the two case studies set in Peru and Nepal
were required for proof of concept purposes and were something the
sponsoring agency requested, it is pretty clear that applying such analysis to the ongoing situation in Mexico—specifically to Los Zetas, Los
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Caballeros Templarios, and the Sinaloa cartel—should be considered
one option for the next logical step in its development.

Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and
Practice from Vietnam to Iraq
By David Fitzgerald
Reviewed by David H. Ucko, Associated Professor, College of International
Security Affairs, National Defense University.

Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2013
285 pages
$45.00

I

n Learning to Forget, David Fitzgerald traces the effects of the Vietnam
War’s legacy on the US Army’s understanding and approach to counterinsurgency. Fitzgerald, a Lecturer in International Politics at University
College Cork, Ireland, broaches this topic chronologically, assessing first
the role of counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War and then how the
memory and lessons of that conflict shaped future institutional attempts
to avoid, learn from, repeat, or even recall whatever it was that happened.
The overarching argument is the memory of Vietnam has been neither
static nor uncontested, but reinterpreted depending on the dominant
context and personalities at any given time. The legacy, thus, remains
“fluid and open to reconstruction” (210-211) and is used to justify a
range of often incompatible arguments. As Fitzgerald implies, this historiographical tug-of-war reveals the long shadow the conflict still casts
over the US Army as an institution.
The book’s strengths include its argumentation and structure; it is
an eminently readable text. It weaves its way from Vietnam and the
codification of its immediate lessons in the 1970s, to the re-encounter
with irregular challenges in Central American in the 1980s, and then to
the peace operations of the 1990s, and their relationship to the Army’s
counterinsurgency legacy. The last two chapters consider the spectacular highs and lows of counterinsurgency during the campaigns in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Throughout, counterinsurgency has most commonly
been marginalized as an institutional priority and area of investment, a
trend bucked only by “major traumatic events,” (206) most recently the
fear of utter failure during the civil war in Iraq.
A second strength of the book is its measured tone and analysis.
Fitzgerald has authored a sober and dispassionate study that resists the
hyperbole and sensationalism typical of other related works. Perhaps
Fitzgerald’s distance from the debate, as an Ireland-based academic,
affords him the necessary perspective. Nonetheless, the nuanced take
on this all-too-often overheated topic is refreshing and, also, necessary.
Third, the research is thorough and well documented in over sixty
pages of footnotes. It is clear that Fitzgerald has consulted the relevant
works, which he applies with due recognition of contending interpretations. The eye to detail and fastidious sourcing may be explained by the
book’s origins as Fitzgerald’s own doctoral thesis, something evident in
the book’s initial literature review and primer on methodology.
This last point relates also to one of the book’s two weaknesses.
Whereas Fitzgerald’s analysis is commendably detached, one might
wish he more often established his own view on controversial and
divisive topics. He cites the dominant voices both for and against
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counterinsurgency’s inclusion as a US military priority but refrains from
presenting his own verdict. He covers the Iraq and Afghanistan wars
well, but it is never explained why Fitzgerald thinks counterinsurgency
succeeded in the former yet “failed to produce the tangible results it
needed” in Afghanistan (198). Similarly, he presents all major interpretations of what went right and wrong in Vietnam, but it is difficult to glean
what Fitzgerald himself, on the basis of his research, sees as the more
convincing explanation.
Second, with the multitude of works now available on the US military’s engagement, aversion, and re-encounter with counterinsurgency,
Fitzgerald’s contribution feels somewhat familiar. With the exception
of a few added anecdotes and some notable sources, particularly in the
first half of the book, the interpretation of past and present campaigns
differs in no substantive way from previous accounts, be it Richard
Downies’ Learning from Conflict, Robert Cassidy’s Peacekeeping in the Abyss,
Richard Lock-Pullan’s US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, or my
own, The New Counterinsurgency Era, which covers similar ground and
comes to very similar conclusions. Fitzgerald refers to these works in
his introduction, but his implicit moving past and building upon the
existing literature are not always convincing. The book’s novelty lies
in its emphasis on how the memory of Vietnam, specifically, affected
and was affected by subsequent events, but this focus is not consistent
throughout and can, at times, feel contrived.
On this latter point, it is not obvious how Vietnam and its 58,000
US casualties related to the peacekeeping operations of 1990s; the
discussions appear related to the far more recent traumas of Somalia
and the limited US national interests at stake. Going further, the book
establishes continuity between Vietnam and subsequent “military operations other than war” but never fully integrates the point made by Dale
Andrade, that Vietnam was both a conventional and an irregular effort,
and that US strategy had to counter a credible communist army along
with a potent insurgent foe. Given this balancing act, how comparable
(or even relevant) is Vietnam to the 1994-95 intervention in Haiti or
the Bosnia campaign thereafter? Even the attempt to compare Vietnam
with Afghanistan or Iraq faces serious problems, ones that the book may
perhaps have benefited from broaching more directly.
On the whole, Learning to Forget is a well researched and superbly
written addition to the ongoing study of counterinsurgency and the US
Army. At a time of urgent reflection for the US Army, and the United
States as a whole, Fitzgerald reminds us of the fluidity of historical interpretation and the unpredictability of what we actually learn. John Lewis
Gaddis sees historians as mandated “to interpret the past for the purposes of the present with a view to managing the future but [critically]
without suspending the capacity to assess the particular circumstances
in which one might have to act, or the relevance of past actions to them”
(The Landscape of History, 2002). Michael Howard’s paraphrasing of Jakob
Burckhardt, cited by Fitzgerald, is therefore apt: “the true use of history,
whether military or civil, is…not to make men clever for next time; it
is to make them wise forever” (211). The book is recommended to all
serious scholars of counterinsurgency, the US Army, and intervention.
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o not pick up this book unless you are looking for a general overview of US Army Special Forces conducting basic Foreign Internal
Defense (FID) in Afghanistan. While an easy read with some entertaining stories, the book omits way too much to be of use to serious students
of irregular warfare.
One Hundred Victories presents two main points as it spins the story
of the successes, failures and challenges of Green Beret Village Stability
Operations and Afghan Local Police Development (VSO/ALP). The
author’s first proposition is that after Special Operations Forces’ (SOF)
initial catastrophic successes in Afghanistan, SOF leadership failed to
articulate a solid game plan to stabilize Afghanistan. Despite having the
training, doctrine, and experience to do so, it allowed conventional forces,
and itself, to focus on combat ops when Foreign Internal Defense and
capacity building should have been the strategy. After years of chasing
targets, in 2009-2010 the Army’s Special Forces finally remembered
their way and led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
effort to build security capacity via VSO/ALP. In this endeavor, they
fought against not only the Taliban, but also conventional units and
senior leadership.
Robinson’s second main idea is that a key reason for failures in
Afghanistan was SOF’s lack of a staffed, theater-level command capable
of interfacing with its own and conventional units. Unable to channel
the power of its mature, experienced and intelligent personnel, SOF
could not seize the initial opportunity to shape Afghanistan’s strategy
and this mistake hampered special operations throughout the war.
This second proposition has merit, but Robinson fails to articulate
why SOF preferred to fight by “SOF tribe” rather than as a comprehensive whole, and tries to convince the reader the only relevant SOF
mission is Foreign Internal Defense. By only telling 1/11th of the story
(there are eleven SOF critical activities), she misrepresents the challenges
and complications of establishing a true unified headquarters. Her slant
towards Green Berets, and their primary mission, is evident and prevents the reader from gaining a full understanding of the vignettes she
uses throughout the book.
It is in her thesis that Foreign Internal Defense and capacity building are the keys to success in Afghanistan where Robinson’s biases really
emerge, and where the book truly misses its mark. Despite repeatedly
making the point that stability comes from developing Afghans, all her
good tales focus on raids or combat. She gives short shrift to Military
Information Support Operations, Civil Affairs, various non-military
developmental organizations, and conventional force development initiatives. 1 One Hundred Victories leads one to believe only SOF can conduct
1      One line on page 230.
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Foreign Internal Defense, and the author accomplishes this by neglecting large swaths of the Afghanistan story while focusing on selected
differences between Special Forces and other units. Lastly, it implies
SOF leadership took the lead in turning the war’s focus from one of
hunting Taliban to one of developing police. It does so despite significant evidence, both from Iraq and Afghanistan, that it was conventional
leaders who had to pull SOF out of its direct action myopia and get it
back into Foreign Internal Defense.
A final critique of this book is that it fails to address many of the
questions it brings forward. A few examples include:
•• Why did SOF lose its way in 2003? What factors, other than the lack
of a sizable headquarters, caused it to forget Foreign Internal Defense
and focus on direct action?
•• Were the claims that Special Forces personnel became cowboys true?
And what actions, other than relieving Major Gant, did anyone take
to address this concern?
•• What was the impact of lessons from Iraq toward how Afghanistan’s
Foreign Internal Defense mission was fought?
•• How much of an impact did the establishment of an AfghanistanPakistan buffer zone actually have on the war?
One Hundred Victories is not a great action story. It is too flawed to
provide significant strategic lessons, and the author has obvious biases
that prevent a good historical analysis of the campaign in Afghanistan.
This book is not worth the time of a professional strategic or operational
leader.

